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When good evidence is not enough: the role of context in
bowel cancer screening policy in New Zealand
Kathy L Flitcroft, James A. Gillespie, Stacy M. Carter, Lyndal J. Trevena and Glenn P.
Salkeld (2011)

Bowel cancer is a serious health problem in developed countries. Australia, the United
Kingdom (UK) and New Zealand (NZ) reviewed the same randomised controlled trial
evidence on the benefits and harms of population-based bowel cancer screening. Yet only
NZ, with the highest age standardised rate of bowel cancer mortality, decided against
introducing a bowel cancer screening programme. This case study of policy making
explores the unique resource, ethical, institutional and political environments in which the
evidence was considered. It highlights the centrality of context in assessing the relative
worth of evidence in policy making and raises questions about the suitability of
knowledge utilisation strategies.

Introduction
Bowel cancer, also known as colorectal cancer, is the second largest cause of cancer
death in men and women combined in Australia, the United Kingdom (UK) and New
Zealand (NZ) (International Agency for Research on Cancer & World Health Organization,
2010a, 2010b, 2010c). There is solid evidence from meta-analysis of randomised
controlled trials (RCTs) that screening for bowel cancer using faecal occult blood tests
(FOBTs) can reduce the relative risk of dying from bowel cancer by up to 25% (Hewitson et
al, 2007).Australia, the UK and NZ examined this same RCT evidence for the benefits and
potential harms of population screening for bowel cancer using FOBTs. The UK and
Australian governments subsequently piloted bowel cancer screening in 2000 and 2002
respectively, and began implementing national screening programmes in 2006.
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In contrast, NZ, with the highest age standardised mortality rates of bowel cancer in the
world (IARC and WHO, 2010c) decided against bowel cancer screening and has only
recently announced a pilot programme to commence in 2011. This case study of bowel
cancer screening policy in NZ explores two research questions: How has context shaped
NZ’s consideration of the evidence and affected policy decisions about bowel cancer
screening? And what are the implications of our findings for the broader issue of getting
research evidence into policy and practice? To position this case study of how evidence is
used or not, we begin with a review of the research utilisation literature.
Getting evidence into policy and practice
In 1979, Caplan outlined his 'two communities' theory, which described researchers and
policy makers as inhabiting 'separate worlds with different and often conflicting values,
different reward systems, and different languages' (1979: 459). Since then, the difficulties
of getting research into policy and practice has become a central issue in public policy
(Pawson, 2006; Nutley et al, 2007; Banks, 2010; Head, 2010a) and four types of models of
research utilisation have been proposed.
The first of these, the 'knowledge transfer' model, viewed the solution to the problem in
market terms and identified the need to increase the supply of evidence to policy makers
(Lavis et al, 2003, 2004, 2005; Nutley et al, 2007). Proponents of this approach advocated
capacity building for research in the form of methodology training, more targeted
commissioned research and systematic reviews of evidence, as well as a focus on
strategies to communicate the research findings in a way policy audiences would
understand (Nutley et al, 2007). They argued that barriers to the use of research should
be explored, based on the underlying assumption that research needs to be actively
pushed to passive policy recipients (the producer-push model). This notion of ‘knowledge
transfer' assumed that the problem could be overcome by linking the stocks of existing
knowledge with the potential users of this knowledge, so it was simply a matter of
communicating and disseminating the objective, value-free and high-quality knowledge,
which was then automatically accepted and utilised (Nutley et al, 2007)
The second model was a further development of the market-based approach, but with
more emphasis on the demand side of the equation (Solesbury, 2001;Armstrong et al,
2008; Bowen and Hyde, 2008). It acknowledged that the process was two-way, and that
providing good-quality research was not always enough. Hence, the term `knowledge
transfer' was expanded to 'knowledge transfer and exchange' (KTE) and the focus moved
to increasing the demand for evidence, a user-pull approach. Strategies included training
of staff in evidence use, facilitating the exposure of policy makers to evidence, offering
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incentives to use research, the use of pilot programmes, and the establishment of a
research culture within government organisations (Nutley et al, 2007).
The third model is a revival of Caplan's (1979) original 'two communities' theory. It views
the problem not as an issue of inadequate supply of, or demand for, evidence, but rather
as a lack of connection between the two. For example, Lomas (2000) talked of the need
for establishing and maintaining ongoing links between the 'two communities' of
researchers and policy makers. This literature focused on the diffusion of knowledge and
what can be done to 'get research into policy and practice' by `bridging the gap' (Elliott
and Popay, 2000; Lavis et al, 2002; Nutley, 2003; Davies, 2004; Bowen and Zwi, 2005;
Brownson et al, 2006; National Institute of Clinical Studies, 2006; Campbell et al, 2007;
Poulos et al, 2007; Hector et al, 2008; Campbell et al, 2009; Mitchell et al, 2009; Schur et
al, 2009). Nutley et al (2007) described the two major types of activities that followed
from this view — those that sought to integrate researchers within the policy process (by
establishing research units, staffed by researchers, within government, or by placing
policy makers in research organisations) and the creation of intermediary institutions to
act as brokers between these two communities. The latter is reflected by the
establishment of health research organisations in the UK such as the National Institute for
Health and Clinical Excellence and the National Treatment Agency (Nutley et al, 2007).
Although the interactive `two communities' approach seems intuitively more likely to
resemble policy making in the real world, its validity is yet to be established. Caplan
(1979) cautioned that for meta-level problems, more and better contact between the two
communities may not necessarily lead to improved understanding and greater utilisation,
but may also breed contempt rather than respect: linkage may increase the quantity but
not the quality of utilisation. This more cautious opinion is supported by a systematic
review of interview studies with policy makers about their use of evidence. This review
was limited by methodological problems relating to the incompatibility of many of the
studies included in the review, and so did not produce any firm conclusions, but the
authors warned that although two-way communication between policy makers and
researchers may improve the use of research, it may also promote the selective use of
research that suits the aims of the policy makers (Innvaer et al, 2002).
More recently, a retrospective survey of principal investigators in three established
research funding agencies in Australia showed that full engagement of researchers and
research users was not associated with research value or utility (Adily et al, 2009). Mitton
et al (2007: 756), in their review of knowledge transfer and exchange literature,
concluded `that despite the rhetoric and growing perception in health services research
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circles of the "value" of KTE ... there is insufficient evidence for conducting "evidencebased" KTE for health policy decision making'.
The need for a broader view
Concerns about the limited success of research utilisation strategies have led to calls for
more `research about research use' (Adily et al, 2009; see also Innvaer et al, 2002; Lavis et
al, 2002; Mitton et al, 2007; Armstrong et al, 2008; Head, 2010b). More specifically,
Nutley et al (2007) argue that the dominant model of research use involves a relationship
between individual researchers and policy makers and note that there is a need for
further investigation into the potential roles that research may play at the organisational
and system levels. A fourth model, `knowledge integration', attempts to address the lack
of organisational focus in this literature. Knowledge integration is defined as `the effective
incorporation of knowledge into decisions, practices and policies of organizations and
systems' (Best et al, 2008: 322).While it acknowledges the importance of organisationallevel factors in decision making, it still does not go beyond advocating `the role of
communications as a central strategy in providing the "glue" for connections between
people and organisations' (Best et al, 2008: 325).
This paper addresses the literature’s lack of focus on the wider context by considering
how evidence was used by policy committees and government departments, and the
broader context within which research is reviewed, used or not used. Dopson and
Fitzgerald (2005: 79) have argued for a ‘more sophisticated and active notion of context’.
They conclude from their empirical findings of evidence use in healthcare organisations
that 'local contexts are multifaceted, multidimensional configurations of forces which
often interact in complex ways ... [and] that context is socially perceived and enacted, and
is, therefore, actively brought into the processes of innovation' (2005: 102-3). While
Dobrow et al (2006) considered the impact of context on evidence use by expert groups,
their analysis did not go beyond the policy formulation stage to policy implementation.
Pawson (2006: 24-5) stresses the role of context in policy implementation, noting that
'interventions, by definition, are always inserted into pre-existing conditions' and argues
for the need to consider evidence in terms of not just 'what works, but what works for
whom and in what circumstances'.
We argue here for a broader and more inclusive definition of context, which considers
the resource, ethical, institutional and political environments that shape not just the
development of policy options, but also their implementation. Using this definition,
context becomes crucial to the consideration of evidence and cannot be regarded as just a
mitigating, residual factor, to be summoned when other explanations fail. Furthermore,
by conceptualising context as a central component of decision making, we demonstrate
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the limitations of traditional knowledge translation theories — how one determines the
benefit-to-harm trade-off of a population screening programme is context specific, and
different policy outcomes are acceptable, even when based on the same evidence. It is
the interpretation of that evidence in the local context that matters.
Methodology
We used case study methodology, which emphasises the importance of describing and
interpreting an event or series of related events and their context, in order to illuminate
more general issues (Stake, 2005). Flyvbjerg (2006) argues for the value of specific cases
and context-dependent knowledge, because of its ability to falsify existing theories and/or
generate new theories: 'the advantage of the case study is that it can "close in" on reallife situations and test views directly in relation to phenomena as they unfold in practice'
(Flyvbjerg, 2006: 225). Contandriopoulos et al (2011: 453), in their large-scale systematic
review of knowledge exchange processes, argue that the breadth and complexity of this
literature make it 'ontologically more suited to case studies than to any other method'.
Methods
Documents
Documents were analysed to clarify both the chronology of events and the arguments
made throughout the policy process. The aim was to obtain all public-domain documents
about bowel cancer screening policy in NZ, and the process began with KF examining the
three major published reviews of bowel cancer screening in NZ (see Table 1). From these
key documents we used snowballing techniques to identify other relevant document
sources, including journal articles, commissioned reports, press releases, NZ government
websites, committee minutes and screening criteria; interview respondents were also
helpful in identifying and providing relevant documents that were not publicly available.
Table I: Major reviews of bowel cancer screening in NZ, 1998-2008
Date
May 1998

Reviewers
Working Party on Screening
for Colorectal Cancer
(clinicians, academics, cancer
organisation representative,
consumer representative)

Report title
Population screening
for colorectal cancer
(National Advisory
Committee on Health
and Disability, 1998)

Nov 2006

Colorectal Cancer Screening
Advisory Group (clinicians,
academics, Ministry of Health
representative, cancer

Report of the Colorectal
Cancer Screening Advisory
Group (CRCSAG, 2006)

Key recommendations
Given the modest potential benefit,
the considerable commitment of
health sector resources and the
small but real potential for harm,
population-based screening for
colorectal cancer with FOBTs is not
recommended in NZ.
This decision should be reviewed as
further evidence becomes available.
A feasibility study is an essential
prerequisite to a decision regarding a
pilot study particularly in relationship
to the provision of colonoscopy,
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organisation representative,
consumer representative)

Mar 2008

Caroline Shaw, Ruth
Cunningham, Diana Sarfati
(academics)

Next steps towards a
feasibility study for
colorectal cancer in New
Zealand: Report for the
Ministry of Health (Shaw
et al, 2008)

given the current capacity
constraints in NZ.
Planning for a feasibility study should
be initiated.
A prevalence and incidence round of
bowel cancer screening should be
conducted within geographically
defined populations to answer key
questions.
This feasibility/pilot study will
require a seven-year timeframe.

Interviews
Twelve face-to-face semi-structured interviews were conducted with key respondents
between 23 September 2008 and 16 October 2008, with two subsequent telephone
interviews, one in December 2008, the other in April 2010. Another respondent provided
written answers to emailed questions on one specific issue. Interviews were semistructured and lasted between 30 and 90 minutes. Questions varied according to the
participant's role in bowel cancer screening policy, but generally covered questions about
their personal involvement in the process, how the committees they were part of
functioned, and questions on how important they believed particular factors were
(research evidence, political and community support, cultural issues, etc). All respondents
were asked the same final question: 'Are there any other factors that you think are
important that we haven't covered?'.
Respondents were selected on the basis of their involvement in policy formulation:
purposive sampling was used to maximise the range of expertise of respondents, the
variety of perspectives, as well as the type of contribution they had made over the
duration of the policy development process. The 14 interviewees were major players
in at least one stage of the evolution of bowel cancer screening policy and several were
involved across all stages. Members of the three major government review committees
(authors of publications in Table 1) were initially targeted, with additional respondents
identified through further document analysis and opportunistic suggestions from
respondents. Respondents included representatives from cancer organisations,
academics, clinicians and former and current Ministry of Health bureaucrats. The Health
Minister at the time was unable to attend his scheduled interview due to parliamentary
commitments, and one member of the 1998 committee declined to be interviewed.
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Data management and qualitative analysis
All interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed either by KF or a professional
transcription service. Responses were coded by KF using NVivo 8 software to tag any part
of the interview transcripts that referred in any way, directly or indirectly, to the use of
evidence. We reviewed all data allocated to the 'use of evidence' code and inductively
identified factors that participants accredited with influencing the use of evidence in
decisions regarding bowel cancer screening in NZ. These factors were grouped into four
categories, which were then used as the basis of our descriptive analysis. We compared
interview responses from those with different experience and expertise, and considered
how these views supported or differed from the relevant documents. Our aim was to
develop a fuller understanding of the different perspectives of informants. To preserve
confidentiality, respondents are referred to by an identification number (ID..), given in
brackets after quotations or references attributable to them.
The role of context in policy decisions about bowel cancer screening
Our analysis revealed four broad categories of factors that were important in shaping
policy responses to the evidence: the resource, ethical, institutional and political contexts.
The resource context
Population cancer screening is resource intensive. The document analysis and key
informant interviews revealed serious shortfalls in the capacity of the health system for
colonoscopy follow-up of people with positive FOBTs. A 2007 survey (Yeoman and Parry,
2007) revealed that one third of public endoscopy units were unable to offer a diagnostic
colonoscopy to patients with possible bowel cancer symptoms within three months of
referral, and that 2,225 patients at higher risk of bowel cancer were waiting more than six
months for surveillance colonoscopies. Public facilities could not cope with the demand
for symptomatic and surveillance colonoscopies and lacked spare capacity for additional
colonoscopies generated by positive FOBTs on asymptomatic, average-risk individuals.
These limitations stemmed from shortages of endoscopists and endoscopy nurses
(Yeoman and Parry, 2007)."The colonoscopy capacity is the major issue. Absolutely.... If
we have a faecal occult blood test, an immunochemical one that gives the same positivity
rate as in Australia, God help us ... we would need an extra 40,000 colonoscopies. And we
do 20,000 currently and don't manage" (ID09).
The lack of a reliable population register and inadequate information technology (IT)
systems were also identified as major resource issues by respondents. Significant
problems remain in these areas, although the situation is improving. Unlike Medicare
Australia or the UK's National Health Service, NZ lacks a national population register to
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issue invitations to screen and coordinate recall and follow-up of initial screenees. Since
the introduction of the NZ primary healthcare strategy in 2001, general practitioners (GPs)
have been required to join a primary health organisation (PHO) and have an enrolled
population of patients. These changes have resulted in a dramatic improvement in
register capability, with respondents in 2008 estimating that between 85 and 95% of
people are now enrolled with a GP, and so are traceable through the PHO registers (ID03,
ID07).
Despite these registry advances, suitable IT systems, which are required to enable
connectivity between the PHO and cancer registers, and the electronic reporting of FOBT,
colonoscopy and pathology results back to these registers, are still under development.
Several respondents noted the importance of getting the IT systems in place before
beginning the roll-out of a programme (ID09, ID10, ID12, ID13) because "it is really
difficult to do it in retrospect and then you have a problem with not knowing what good
or harm you are doing with your screening" (ID10).
The relative importance of resource constraints on policy decisions about bowel cancer
screening is debatable. On the one hand, the resource context has clearly impacted on the
timeline for a bowel cancer screening programme — there were major workforce, registry
and IT issues that had to be addressed before the introduction of a programme was
deemed possible. Yet, on the other hand, as one respondent noted, "you can argue about
whether health system capacity is sort of the ultimate deciding factor, because if you put
enough resources into improving health system capacity, you can have a screening
programme. You know there's never spare capacity sitting around in the health system
waiting for a screening programme to come and take it up" (ID09).
The ethical context
Concern over the ethical consequences of screening, at both the individual and societal
levels, also played a major role in shaping the decision not to screen. Non-maleficence is
one of the cornerstones of bioethics (Beauchamp and Childress, 2008). In 2003, the
National Health Committee reviewed existing criteria for screening programmes and
produced its own set of eight principles customised for NZ, devised to ensure that a
screening programme is ‘safe and effective’ (National Advisory Committee on Health and
Disability, 2003). These criteria specifically noted that ‘the potential benefit from the
screening program should outweigh the potential physical and psychological harm
(caused by the test, diagnostic procedures and treatment)’ and that ‘there should be
consideration of social and ethical issues’ (2003: 3).
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Concerns about individual harms
Following publication of the RCTs on bowel cancer screening in late 1996 (Hardcastle et
al, 1996; Kronberg et al, 1996), the National Advisory Committee on Health and Disability,
known as the National Health Committee (NHC), established a Working Party on
Screening for Colorectal Cancer in early 1997. Over an 18-month period, the Working
Party undertook a thorough review of the bowel cancer screening literature and
concluded that: `[Oven the modest potential benefit, the considerable commitment of
health sector resources and the small but real potential for harm, population-based
screening for colorectal cancer with faecal occult blood tests is not recommended in New
Zealand' (National Advisory Committee on Health and Disability, 1998: 7).
The focus on the potential harms of screening is understandable when placed in the
context of NZ's recent history of adverse screening incidents. These included the
deliberate experimental non-treatment of women identified with cervical carcinoma in
situ at The National Women's Hospital in Auckland (Women's Health Action Trust,
undated), under-reporting of cervical intra-epithelial invasion over several years in the
Gisborne region (Gisborne Cervical Screening Inquiry), both of which resulted in women
dying, and a repeated clerical error causing some women with mammographic
abnormalities being allocated to routine follow-up in the Otago and Southland regions
(Chamberlain, 2002).All three incidents led to formal investigations and a very public
exposure of the potential harms of screening. The lessons learned had a major impact on
the professionals running or planning screening programmes: "I think people who work in
screening are very aware of the legacy of those things and ... we very much focus on
harms of screening because, because we've, you know, we've had all these women die"
(ID09). One former Ministry official commented they were there "in those early days with
ministers, facing those women in Gisborne, and [I] was very aware of the failures and very
aware of what needed to happen and also very aware of how, you know, screening is not
like other health services you know, you can do great harm" (ID13).
The second review of bowel cancer screening by the Colorectal Cancer Screening
Advisory Group (CRCSAG) reported its findings in November 2006 (CRCSAG, 2006). These
specifically addressed the 2003 screening criteria (National Advisory Committee on Health
and Disability, 2003) and contained a chapter on the potential harms of screening. This
report had access to information on the longer-term follow-up of the original trials and
evidence from the UK pilot programme, which included reassuring data on the safety of
bowel cancer screening, with few major adverse events such as bleeding following biopsy,
and no recorded deaths from screening colonoscopies (CRCSAG, 2006).
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Closely related to the concerns over harms to the individual, is the issue of quality of the
screening programme. The CRCSAG acknowledged that the extent of colonoscopy
complication rates 'will always be dependent on the level of expertise of the operator'
(CRCSAG, 2006:53). As one respondent stated: "New Zealand is very conscious about
quality in screening ... New Zealanders expect quality in a screening programme and they
get very mad if they don't get it" (ID03).The National Screening Unit (NSU) was specifically
established in response to the lack of adequate quality assurance measures identified by
the 2001 Gisborne Inquiry into cervical cancer screening, and according to one Ministry
official has helped to "restore confidence of the ministers as well as of the public in
screening."
Concerns about societal harms
The 2006 CRCSAG report also contained a chapter on the social and ethical issues
relating to screening. This chapter specifically examined the cultural issues involved in
bowel cancer screening for Maori and the potential for screening to increase inequalities
among population subgroups, demonstrating that these issues are considered to be social
and ethical issues in NZ. We have classified these issues as societal harms because they
threaten a particular group in society, rather than individuals.
Approximately 15% of New Zealanders identify as Maori (Ministry of Social Development
[NZ], 2009) and policy makers were concerned about increasing inequity, both in access to
screening and in treatment outcomes. Inequitable access was highlighted in the 2005
report Access to cancer services for Maori (Cormack et al, 2005: iv), which noted the need
to address the 'fundamental drivers of the differential distribution in New Zealand of the
factors associated with access, such as racism and unequal power relations'. The
subsequent publication of Unequal impact: Maori and non-Maori cancer statistics 19962001 (Robson et al, 2006) demonstrated the disparities in outcomes for bowel cancer
specifically. Although bowel cancer is more common among non-Maori than Maori,
mortality rates are similar for both populations. Maori were significantly less likely than
non- Maori to be diagnosed at a localised stage, and once diagnosed with bowel cancer,
Maori were two thirds more likely than non-Maori to die from their cancer.
An overlapping source of potential inequity is socioeconomic. Fewer than half the
population has private health insurance, and although treatment in a public hospital is
free, co-payments are required for most people to see their GP, resulting in comparatively
high user charges for primary care. These costs have been identified as a significant
barrier to GP access (Robinson, 2003).
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Consideration of these societal harms made assessment of the benefit-to-harm trade-off
of bowel cancer screening by policy makers more complicated and time consuming. The
benefits of bowel cancer screening had to outweigh its harms, not only to the individuals
taking part in screening, but also to society as a whole. Furthermore, the ethical
imperative to avoid increasing socioeconomic inequities limited the delivery and pricing
options for a bowel cancer screening programme, requiring public sector delivery (so
placing an added burden on an already stretched system) and minimal out-of-pocket costs
for participants.
The institutional context
Decisions about bowel cancer screening policy took place within a particular
institutional context, which determined the constraints on the policy-making
processes. We identified four types of institutional constraints.
Shared responsibility for decision making
The Treaty of Waitangi, a treaty between the Maori tribes and representatives of the
British government, was signed in 1840 and formally (although not legally) recognised the
Maori population as the traditional owners of NZ and entitled them to share in
government. In 1999, the newly elected Clarke Labour Government pledged to implement
structural reform of the health sector, and as part of this process, incorporated specific
Treaty of Waitangi references in new health legislation (Earp, 2004). The New Zealand
Health Strategy, also published in 2000, is based on the three treaty principles:
participation of Maori at all levels; partnership in service delivery; and protection and
improvement of Maori health status (Ministry of Health [NZ], 2000). From a policy
development perspective, the treaty provisions ensured that policy makers considered
the need to respect ethnic difference and avoid making one-size-fits-all policy decisions.
Although this approach inevitably results in longer consultative processes and the need
for more targeted implementation strategies, the delays could be readily justified on
equity or social justice grounds. However, as one respondent noted, consultation is not
always genuinely about power sharing, but may in some instances be about getting
subsequent Maori approval of decisions that have already been made (ID05).
Conflicting advice from advisory bodies
In response to publication of follow-up data from the original RCTs of bowel cancer
screening and evaluation reports by the UK and Australian pilot programmes, the NSU
commenced a review of bowel cancer policy in late 2004. As part of this detailed review
process, the NSU commissioned a wide range of additional reports into specific aspects of
bowel cancer screening. These included a health technology assessment review to look at
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different modalities of bowel cancer screening; a review of cancer registry data; a
workforce capability study; a consumer acceptability study; an economic evaluation; a
report on inequalities; a survey of colonoscopy capacity; and an international literature
review by New Zealand Health Technology Assessment, a research unit of the University
of Otago (ID13). The NSU also convened the CRCSAG to provide independent strategic
advice and recommendations on the appropriateness and feasibility of bowel cancer
screening. The NSU had originally planned to incorporate the CRCSAG findings into its own
report, but this group insisted on producing a separate and totally independent report for
the Minister of Health. The CRCSAG's final report, published in November 2006, stated
that la] feasibility study is an essential pre-requisite to a decision regarding a pilot study'
(CRCSAG, 2006: 10).
Other policy advisers advocated a more proactive stance. In January 2007, the National
Screening Advisory Committee (NSAC) prepared a report for the Director-General on the
CRCSAG findings, recommending that 'consideration needs to be given to developing a
detailed implementation plan' (NSAC, 2007: 2). In March 2007, the NSU hosted Dr Ellis
Friedman, a regional director of public health in the UK, to advise on policy options and
his report recommended 'the presumptive acceptance' of a bowel cancer screening
programme if the minimum success criteria of the feasibility study are met (Friedman,
2007: 8).The Cancer Control Council had also independently advised the Minister of
Health in early 2007 that a bowel cancer screening programme should be implemented
(Towel cancer funding ...', 2008). The NSU compiled a policy briefing for the Minister of
Health based on the results of the background papers and reports it had commissioned,
including the CRCSAG report and the Friedman report, as well as on the NSAC report and
consultation with the Cancer Control Council. This briefing recommended that "New
Zealand should proceed with implementing a bowel cancer screening programme
presumptive on the outcome of feasibility studies" (ID13).
There was a subtle but important difference between the CRCSAG and the NSU
recommendations — the former implied that nothing needed to be done until the results
of the feasibility study were available as that would determine whether NZ should
proceed with a bowel cancer screening programme. The latter suggested that NZ should
proceed with a bowel cancer screening programme and the feasibility study would test
some certain key questions about how it might be organised. The NSU position implied
that more action was necessary and it made further recommendations to the Minister of
Health about the need to build capacity within the Ministry to both deliver a feasibility
study (or pilot) and prepare for the eventual roll-out of the programme (ID13).
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Restructuring within the Ministry of Health
Conflicting advice and lack of consensus on how to proceed coincided with major
personnel changes at senior levels of the Ministry. A new chief executive and directorgeneral of the Ministry of Health, appointed in July 2006, began a process of restructuring
the directorates. The NSU was moved from the Public Health Directorate (which was
disbanded) into the Health and Disability National Services Directorate. This move
reflected a reframing of screening from a public health programme to a national service
delivery programme (ID08). According to one respondent, the transfer of responsibility for
bowel cancer screening policy also related to a more general view within the Ministry that
policy advice could be done by anyone and did not require specific content knowledge
(ID09). Because the main obstacle to bowel cancer screening was colonoscopy capacity,
screening came to be seen as a health service issue and so was reassigned to the "part of
the Ministry that deals with hospital services" (ID10).
The disbanding of the Public Health Directorate also meant that there was no longer
anyone with public health or screening expertise on the Executive. Moved further to the
periphery, the NSU had difficulty in securing Ministry support to build the capacity
required to prepare for a bowel cancer screening programme (ID13). The Ministry
transferred responsibility for the development of the bowel cancer screening programme
from the NSU to the Cancer Control area of the Ministry, which is within the Sector
Capability and Innovation Directorate. The rationale for this change was the need to "keep
the screening programme very closely linked to the provision of bowel cancer services for
high-risk people and also bowel cancer services for symptomatic people" (ID14).
Lack of leadership
Although bowel cancer screening had found a new home in the Cancer Control Team, no
one was really driving the preparation for a bowel cancer screening programme. The
process stalled amid a myriad of competing priorities (ID08) as "the Ministry of Health's ...
internal process went strangely awry and nothing happened" (ID09). Delay led to
irritation, particularly among clinicians. One respondent recalled their frustration
"that there was a recommendation now that we move forward with screening
for colorectal cancer ... but that nothing was happening.... You know, people
were working but there was no impetus or major leadership. It was all a bit clunk,
clunk, clunk sort of stuff. It was hard to see how we were going to step up to the
level that we were going to implement, even a feasibility study, without a major
will and driver and funding for that." (1D03)
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This institutional context set boundaries within which policy makers operated and helps
explain the delay in progress: Maori perspectives had to be respected with consequent
delays; conflicting sources of advice contributed to policy confusion, if not inertia; and
effective decision making was difficult amid ministerial reshuffling and in the absence of
strong leadership.
The political context
The lack of progress with bowel cancer screening policy was significantly influenced by
the wider political context. Government commitments to expensive health programmes
such as bowel cancer screening require not just evidence, but also political will. In March
2007, the-then Minister of Health approved a paper, 'which set up the groundwork for the
feasibility study' (Cunliffe, 2008). However, according to one respondent, he did not
follow up with the Ministry when its response had been "very slow" (ID08), while another
commented that he "certainly did not have [bowel cancer screening] high on his agenda"
(ID03).
The issue gained momentum when David Cunliffe was appointed Minister of Health on
31 October 2007. In early 2008, an Interim Colorectal Cancer Screening Reference Group
was formed within the Ministry of Health (ID03). An informal group comprising Ministry
staff and external experts, it advised the Ministry on how to move forward with bowel
cancer screening recommendations made by the CRCSAG in 2006. The Ministry of Health
commissioned a scoping study, giving the authors only a five-week timeframe, and this
was presented to the Minister in March 2008 (Shaw et al, 2008).The report noted that the
CRCSAG had 'specifically advised that a feasibility study rather than a pilot study be
conducted, in order that it is explicit that a decision to proceed with a national
programme has not been made' (2008: 57). It discussed the semantics of the terminology
used, noting that `there are no differences in design of feasibility and pilot studies, and so
the decision between the two will be based on other considerations such as Government
commitment to screening and public perception of the implications of the two terms'
(2008: 57). This detailed scoping report noted that there was a `huge amount of work'
needed to prepare for any bowel cancer screening activity and proposed a two-year
planning period for preparation of a feasibility/pilot study (2008: 95).
However, 1998 was an election year, and political considerations were beginning to
overtake evidentiary ones. The short three-year electoral cycle was poorly synchronised
with calls for a slow, evidence-based approach to bowel cancer screening as advocated in
the scoping report: pressure was mounting on the government to act without delay. The
Interim Colorectal Cancer Screening Reference Group assessed and commented on the
scoping report in March 2008, also informing the Minister of Health that professional
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groups were becoming impatient because no decision had been made and were planning
to formally lobby the government (ID03). On 28 March 2008, the Opposition
spokesperson on health, Tony Ryall, tabled a written question in Parliament asking
Associate Minister O'Connor whether or not the government had undertaken a feasibility
study for establishing a national bowel cancer screening programme (New Zealand
Parliament, 2008).
Clinicians, also frustrated with the lack of progress, entered the political arena, and
approached well-known television reporter Lorelei Mason (ID06) to ask Minister Cunliffe
directly: "Why are we still waiting for bowel cancer screening in New Zealand?" (ID15).
Cunliffe confounded his critics by using the television interview in May 2008 to announce
the introduction of a bowel cancer screening programme (ID15).
The political context had revealed the limits on the use of evidence in policy making,
particularly in an election period. After commissioning the scoping report to specifically
consider the data necessary to inform an evidence-based bowel cancer screening
programme, the same minister promptly ignored this expert advice in the face of growing
political demands for immediate action. As one respondent commented: "because
screening is so political and decisions always come down to politicians, really advisory
groups can only have a very limited role because in the end it's a judgement call from a
politician about whether they want to spend the money and whether it's going to get
them votes" (ID09).
In August, the timetable for the programme was fast-tracked, with plans announced for
a pilot to begin by the end of 2009, with the aim of commencing a roll-out of the
programme from the end of 2011 (NZPA, 2008). The Labour Party had been behind in the
polls and the announcement earned it some positive press, while at the same time
trumping the Opposition's plans to announce a programme of its own. The
announcement of an even tighter timeline for the programme alarmed those working in
the Ministry of Health. Bowel cancer screening had been on “the possibility books” but “it
wasn’t a priority on our work programme” (ID11). Once the announcement was made,
Ministry staff “were all hands to the pumps” (ID11) as the impromptu decision had not
taken into account their competing priorities and existing workload.
Despite the NSU's experience in developing and running breast and cervical cancer
screening programmes, the Cancer Control Team retained responsibility for fast-tracking
the introduction of bowel cancer screening, and recruited additional staff to work in a
specialist Bowel Cancer Programme in mid-2008. The minister also established a Bowel
Cancer Taskforce in August 2008. It initially comprised six 'experts', but no specific district

15 | P a g e

health board or Maori representation, and was responsible for providing advice and
recommendations to the minister on a programme to improve bowel cancer outcomes.
Associate Minister O'Connor noted that `[a] critical part of the Taskforce's operation will
be to make sure there is a workforce ready to begin the screening programme' (O'Connor,
2008) .Although some additional funding and training for colonoscopists had been
allocated, training of colonoscopists takes time and this deadline was seen by all involved
as unrealistic, especially given the enormous amount of work that still needed to be done
on registry and IT issues. Ministry staff hoped that the independent
Bowel Cancer Taskforce would be able to persuade the minister of the impossibility of
his timeline: “certainly the advice [the Ministry] had provided had indicated squarely the
risks
involved
around
trying
to
accelerate
a
programme”
(ID14).
As it happened, the Labour Party was defeated in the election on 8 November
2008 and the new National Party government, which now had three years to oversee
the introduction of a bowel cancer screening programme, could take the time to
consider the evidence properly. The Taskforce did not submit its final report to the
Minister of Health, Tony Ryall, until early 2010. On 5 May 2010 Ryall, announced
that NZ$24 million had been allocated over four years for a bowel cancer screening
pilot programme to run from 2011 to 2015. A decision on whether or not to proceed
with a national bowel cancer screening programme will not be made until the pilot
data have been analysed and the pilot programme evaluated (Ryall, 2010).
Lessons from the case study: (I) the role of context
Our case study identified the resource, ethical, institutional and political environments
within which evidence was considered and prioritised. All of these environments are
interrelated and demonstrate the active and multifaceted qualities of context as
described by Dopson and Fitzgerald (2005). In the NZ case, the role of context was crucial
and extended beyond the Ministry of Health to broadly shared, national perspectives. The
ethical context framed the way in which individual and societal harms were valued, so RCT
evidence of benefits, which satisfied policy makers in the UK and Australia, was
considered insufficient in NZ. Hence, the traditional evidence hierarchy, where highquality RCT evidence trumps all, was moderated by ethical considerations, prioritising
from the outset specific consideration of what was required to deliver a safe, high-quality
and equitable national bowel cancer screening programme.
Screening decisions in NZ need to take into account not just the resource issues, which
are of concern to all countries contemplating screening programmes, but also the
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potential ethical consequences of a bowel cancer screening programme, which should be
important in any jurisdiction but are not always considered, at least not explicitly. In
addition to a pronounced focus on the more traditional potential physical and
psychosocial harms for individuals, stemming from its history of other screening
programmes, the NZ case was also particularly concerned with a much broader group of
potential societal harms. These included screening's impact on ethnic and socioeconomic
inequity. The addition of these societal harms made assessment of the benefit-to-harm
trade-off of bowel cancer screening much more complicated and time consuming.
Furthermore, this already difficult process was compounded by the institutional and
political context within which these assessments were taking place. The Treaty of
Waitangi obligations meant that policy options considered the specific impact on Maori,
thus displacing the traditional emphasis on the evidence for efficacy, and considering
outcomes in terms of equality and social justice. Conflicting policy advice led to confusion
over policy direction, which was in turn exacerbated by ministerial re-organisation of
personnel, directorates and responsibilities for bowel cancer screening policy. A lack of
ministerial leadership and the absence of a sense of urgency about preparing for the
implementation of a bowel cancer screening programme left the Ministry ill-prepared to
deal with the sudden political announcement by Minister Cunliffe that bowel cancer
screening would go ahead as soon as possible. An imminent election had finally supplied
the incentive for cementing bowel cancer screening on the policy agenda, but political
pressure to act quickly led to the abandonment by Cunliffe of the evidence-based
approach he had previously sanctioned when commissioning the scoping report. The new
government was unencumbered by election commitments to bowel cancer screening and
had the breathing space to undertake a more considered review of the evidence compiled
by the Bowel Cancer Taskforce. The decision to pilot bowel cancer screening in New
Zealand from 2011 will allow for the careful assessment of the benefit-to-harm trade-off
in the local context, but means that NZ is still at least four years away from introducing a
programme.
Lessons from the case study: (2) implications for research utilisation
The NZ case has also demonstrated the impact of context on the policy process
generally, beyond the specific confines of population screening policy. Our findings
support the notion that conventional strategies for getting evidence into policy and
practice, involving greater collaboration between researchers and policy makers, will not
necessarily lead to more evidence-based policy, as the context within which policy
decisions are made is crucial. Head (2010b: 77) contrasts this rational expectation of
research utilisation with the `practical limitations on the rational processes typical in the
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real world of political decision-making, which is characterised by bargaining, entrenched
commitments, and the interplay of diverse stakeholder values and interests'.
If the active role and broad nature of context is accepted, it suggests a potential
difficulty with the argument that global methods can be used to apply evidence in
different decision-making contexts, as Dobrow et al (2006) advocate. Similarly, the
primacy of context in policy making calls into question the notion of` global evidence' and
`global public goods' (Lavis et al, 2008). In this case study, academics, clinicians,
bureaucrats and health professionals worked together on several committees and
thoroughly reviewed the same evidence as experts in the UK and Australia. It was neither
a lack of evidence, nor poor communication between researchers and policy makers, that
led to different policy decisions. The decision to screen is no more or less inherently
evidence based than a decision not to screen. The evidence was substantially the same,
but the contexts in which the evidence was considered differed.

Conclusion
Despite having the highest age standardised rate of bowel cancer in the world, NZ has
taken a cautious approach to the introduction of bowel cancer screening. Our findings
have demonstrated that context is crucial to the consideration and prioritisation of
evidence. Furthermore, the complex relationship between context and evidence calls into
question the assumptions of the traditional knowledge translation literature: greater
collaboration between researchers and policy makers will not be sufficient to improve the
uptake of the best available evidence if the resource, ethical, institutional and/or political
contexts privilege other concerns over evidence. Rather than searching for global
methods to increase the use of evidence in policy decisions, it may be more useful to look
in detail at what evidence works for whom and in what circumstances (Pawson, 2006).
Further case studies of the entire policy process — from problem identification to
implementation and evaluation — may help to identify more successful strategies to
increase the relative role of evidence in different contexts.
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